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Comments on Why does time pass? by Brad Skow
Valia Allori
Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference 2008
Summary of the theory and of the claims of the paper
(This is just to see whether I understood the claims of the paper, not necessarily to be read at the
conference)
In his very interesting and ingenious paper, Brad presents an alternative to the standard moving
spotlight theory of time and claims that his theory has several advantages over the alternatives and
therefore deserves consideration.
According to Brad's view, there is space (in some sense to be specified), there is time (in some sense to
be specified), there are material objects (the universe). In addition to them, there is the NOW, the
present moment. Brad claims that his view is superior to the standard spotlight theory of time because
1) it explains more, and 2) it is easier to defend.
Here are the things that Brad's theory is supposed to explain better: the reason why the NOW moves
always in the future direction, and why the rate of motion of the NOW is constant (see below).
His view is easier to defend than the standard theory because it enables us to define the rate of motion
of the NOW without the embarrassment of saying that it is one second per second or to appeal to the
mysterious entity of supertime (as in the standard view).
Here is a summary of Brad's view as I see it:
The universe has a career in configuration space (roughly defined as the space of properties the
universe as a whole has). It is a sequence of properties in a given order (it can be represented by a
function from reals to configuration space variables). The order of the properties is defined in terms of
causal dependence: B follows A in the universe's career if A brings about B.
There are five fundamental principles from which everything else follows:
1. the necessity of change: the universe keeps changing (the universe's career is represented by a
function from real numbers, presumably representing time, to variables representing properties
in configuration space. This function has never the derivative equal to zero, which would
represent a non-changing universe).
2. the NOW is inert in its temporal location (if I understand correctly, the temporal evolution of
the NOW is a function from real numbers, representing time, to real numbers, representing time
as well).
3. the open future: if the NOW is never located at a time t, then the universe is in no state at all at t
(the NOW and the universe are connected: there is no state of the universe at time t if there is no
NOW at time t).
4. the NOW respects temporal topology: the motion of the NOW is continuous (among all the
functions that could represent the evolution of the NOW, the ones that can actually represent it
are those that are not interrupted).
5. second-order continuity: the NOW cannot switch direction of motion discontinuously (among
all the functions that could represent the evolution of the NOW, the ones that can actually
represent it are those that do not have sharp edges).
Why these principles are needed:
principles 1,2 and 3 guarantee that the NOW moves in a given direction. In fact, due to 2, the NOW
would stay put while, given 1, the universe moves. It is 3 that connects the motion of the NOW to the
one of the universe: when the universe changes in time, it also changes in state (from 1) and 3 demands
that there cannot be any state at time t if the NOW is not located at t. That is, for the universe to satisfy
1, the NOW has to move in time. Principle 4 guarantees that the NOW does not jump back and forth in

time and principle 5 guarantees that the NOW does not change direction of motion.
Defining the future direction as the direction in which the NOW moves, one can conclude that it
follows from principles 1 to 5 that the NOW moves always towards the future (this is the explanation
of why the NOW moves toward the future).
The rate of motion of the NOW is defined as the temporal distance travelled divided by the amount of
change of the universe. The amount of the universe's change is defined in terms of configuration space
using a suitable metric that depends on the intrinsic properties (this is the definition of how fast the
NOW moves).
The NOW moves at a constant rate since there is no cause that could account for the change of the rate
through time (principle of sufficient reason): the only possible cause could be the difference in
pressure for the NOW to move at different times, but the notion of pressure cannot be defined in this
view. In fact the only definition could be in terms of length of the arrow associated to any point in the
universe's career, but functions with different derivatives could agree on the order of the universe's
properties and therefore would represent the same career (this is the explanation of why the NOW
moves at a constant rate).
One cannot compare the rates at which the NOW moves in all possible worlds and in our world
because there are no absolute facts about how far apart are two points in time, just comparative facts
and comparison can only be made within the same world.
My comments will focus just on some aspects of the paper.
A (not very interesting) technical remark:
At page 6, top of the page, one reads: If there were two numbers r1 and r2 and a single property A
such that h(r)=A whenever r1<r<r2, then would have zero derivative at A. But that is not the only way
for it to have zero derivative. If h slows down as it approaches A, stops when it gets to A, takes a
sharp left and then speeds up again, it will have zero derivative at A even though h only maps one
real number to A.
It is probably a typo, since the derivative is with respect to the elements of the domain (namely the
reals) and not of the range (the variables representing the properties in configuration space). That is,
one should have written: If there were two numbers r1 and r2 and a single property A such that h(r)=A
whenever r1<r<r2, then would have zero derivative in r, the point in which h(r)=A. But that is not the
only way for it to have zero derivative. If h slows down as it approaches A, stops when it gets to r,
the point in which h(r)=A, takes a sharp left and then speeds up again, it will have zero derivative
in r even though h only maps one real number to A.
Another technical (but more interesting) remark:
Principle 4 states that: the NOW respects temporal topology: the motion of the NOW is continuous.
More precisely, the function (from reals to reals, if I am correct), call it N, that represents the evolution
of the NOW is a continuous function. Technically, one says that the function N is C 0.
Principle 5 is: Second-order continuity: the NOW cannot switch its direction of motion
discontiuously. I interpret this principle (especially due to its name) as saying that the function (from
reals to reals) that represents the evolution of the NOW is derivable twice and the second derivative is a
continuous function. Technically, one says that the function N is C 2. If I am correct in my
interpretation, there is a theorem that states that in order for a function to be C 2 (derivable twice with a
continuous second order derivative), then it is necessary for the function to be C 0 (a continuous
function). That is: if principle 5 is true then also 4 is true as well. In other words, there is no necessity
of assuming 4 if we already assume 5.
This is so because for a function to be derivable twice it has to be derivable once, and in order to be
derivable once it has to be a continuous function. In fact, to be derivable in a point means that, roughly

I am very uncomfortable with the notion of causation being used to define an ordering that will be
used, in turn, to define a temporal ordering. In fact, it seems to me, the relation is backwards: very
naively, if A always temporally happens before B then A causes B; rather than if A causes B then A
temporally precedes B. What always happens is that one has to start from some unexplained principles
in order to explain the rest. The idea is that one should use the most obvious and self-evident claims as
the fundamental principles upon which one constructs all the other explanations.
In this case Brad is taking causation as fundamental in order to define the temporal ordering instead of
doing the other way round. That is, causation is the fundamental principle. In other words, it is the most
obvious and self-evident principle from which one should naturally start building an explanation of all
the other phenomena. I simply disagree: I have no clue of what causation is. To be completely sincere, I
tend to believe that there is no causation, even if I haven't got any super-strong argument for it. Be that
as it may, how can I build up an explanation onto something that I do not understand? If Brad wants to
convince me that this is the natural thing to do, I think that he should spend more time in arguing for it.
A worry concerning the second law
Here is a worry concerning principle 1: it seems to be contrary to (or at least in tension with) what we
know about physics. I am thinking about the second law of thermodynamics.
The second law of thermodynamics is a law about the possible histories of the universe and states that
it is overwhelmingly likely that the universe will end up in a state that does not allow anymore any
further change. The second law can be derived by Newtonian mechanics. Consider again phase space,
which is partitioned into macrostates, each representing a given set of macroscopic property. By
definition, the size of a macrostate is proportional to the entropy (another typical macroscopic
property). Assume the following fundamental laws: PROB, a probability distribution over the initial
condition of the universe; PH, the past hypothesis, the assumption that the universe started off in a
state of low entropy. If we assume PROB and PH among the fundamental laws then we can explain the
time-asymmetry of macroscopic phenomena (including the second law) given time-symmetry of the
fundamental laws of physics. The reasoning can be understood as follow with the aids of two pictures,
figures 4 and 5. First consider figure 4: given the probability distribution on the initial condition PROB,
we can define exactly what is meant by size of the macrostates. It turns out that there is a state, the
equilibrium state, that is much bigger than the others. It should be clear from this diagram that it is
overwhelmingly likely that a macrostate will evolve towards a macrostate with a larger entropy (given
that they are bigger) until it reaches the larges state of all, the equilibrium state.

Figure 4
Once this state is reached, there is no more change (that is, it is extremely unlikely that the universe

will exit that state in a short amount of time).
Note that this is not enough to account for the time-asymmetry of macroscpoic phenomena, given that
it is also overwhelmingly likely for a state to have evolved from a larger entropy state, as shown in
figure 5. Therefore, we also need to postulate PH, namely that the initial state of the universe was one
of a very low entropy.

Figura 5
To conclude, according to statistical mechanics the universe tends to a state of maximal entropy (the
equilibrium state) that, when reached, prevents any other change. When this state of thermodynamic
death is reached, the universe does not change anymore, so how can principle 1 be true if the laws of
physics are true as well?
Justification of the principles
If I am correct so far, there are 5 principles to the theory: 1,2,3,5,6. From them, everything else follows.
But what is the justification of these principles?
Brad does not spend time in trying to argue for them: he simply claims that they seem more natural that
the ones assumed by the standard view. With that I think he means that they are the ones that require
less explanation when compared with the others (in particular the ones used by the standard view).
This is what he writes about principle 2 about the natural state of the NOW: I think that being at rest is
the more natural natural state. Period. Why? Nothing more is said.
Even if we grant that it is so, another questions just comes spontaneously: Why it is natural for the
NOW to stay put while it is natural for the universe to change? That is: Setting aside the worry I laid
out in the previous section about its plausibility, what is the justification of principle 1? The same
problem arises for principle 3: Why is that the NOW and the universe are connected in that particular
way and not another?
Of course one could answer: I need 1, 2 and 3 to derive the motion of the NOW. But this is an ad hoc
(and therefore unsatisfactory) response: we want to explain x therefore we postulate some principles
that have no other justification than the one that they are necessary to derive x. We should instead start
from some principles that have some independent justification and then derive x. One of the things that
make a principle not ad hoc is its independent justification, but also the fact that some of its derivations
are somewhat surprising. In Brad's case, instead, the principles seem to have no other justification than
the one that they are just what is needed to derive x, and therefore there is nothing surprising that x
follows from the principles. This is also evident in the case of principle 5 what I have called principle
6. In fact, what else could be the justification of principe 5 if not: Otherwise the NOW does not
behave as I want and what else could be the justification of principle 6 if not: I need to avoid the onesecond-per-second objection?
The worry is then the following: if there is no other independent reason to believe 1,2,5,6, why should
we believe them to be true?

Assessment of the theory
Taken the five principles to be true, we can provide an explanation of why the NOW moves, and how
fast it moves. The standard theory simply stipulates that the NOW moves (therefore providing no
explanation for its motion) while in Brad's theory the NOW's natural state is the rest state (principle 2)
and the motion of the NOW is explained as a consequence of the motion of the universe (principle 1)
and of the relation between the NOW and the universe (principle 3).
Concerning the question of how fast the NOW moves, the standard view faces the embarrassing
response of one-second-per-second (What does that mean? Does it even make sense to ask the
question?). In Brad's view, in contrast, given what I have called principle 6, the rate of the NOW is
defined in terms of time interval over amount of change in the universe. In this way, the rate is not one
second per second, so we avoid the embarrassment of this response.
For these reasons, Brad claims that his theory is superior to the standard view: it explains what the
other theory stipulates and avoids the mentioned problematic objection.
When considering the superiority in explanation of his theory, Brad writes that when judging the
relative merits of two theories, what is important is not how much each theory leaves unexplained (my
note: the number of fundamental postulates). What is important is whether the things that go
unexplained in the theory seem to demand explanation. Insofar as I accept the spotlight theory, I think
the facts that the NOW moves, and that it moves at a constant rate, demand explanation. Or, at least,
they demand explanation more than the principles I use in my theory to explain them.
I am not an enthusiast supporter of Ockham's razor: I have no problem with the claim that a theory, call
it T1, which is based on, say, 5 principles could be preferred to another theory, call it T2, based on, say,
just 2 principles if the former explains better or more things than the latter. My problem is that this
clause is ceteris paribus: all other things being equal in the two theories. That is to say, if the principles
of T1 and of T2 are equally plausible, then if T1 explains better or more things than T2, T1 has to be
preferred. But this is not the case here: T1 (Brad's theory) assumes more principles than T2 (the
standard spotlight theory), and, given that T1 assumes as postulates some of the consequences of T2
(the change of the universe) and vice versa T2 assumes as postulates some of the consequences of T1
(the motion of the NOW), it cannot be that both postulate are equally plausible to the same person!
Brad's intuition is that the more natural natural state of the NOW is to be at rest so he assumes it as the
fundamental principle to be used to explain other things, such as the motion of the NOW. A spotlight
theorist's intuition is just the opposite: she believes that the more natural natural state is for the NOW to
keep moving and she uses it to explain the rest. In other words, the things that demand explanation
depend on the person's intuitions, and more needs to be said concerning what demands for an
explanation and what constitutes a satisfactory explanation.
An open question
There could be more many comments, due to the ingenuity of the paper, but I will write no more. Just
one open question on which I would like to hear more: is Brad's theory compatible with relativity
theory and the constraints that it imposes (or that it does not impose) on time?
Thanks for the interesting paper!

